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INTRODUCTION
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD AND THE POLITICS OF LABOR LAWt
DAVID L. GREGORY*
The decade of the 1980's will be remembered as the most significant in the past
half century for its profound impact on labor and employment law, theory, and practice.
It is a decade of rapid transition, especially influenced by the political ideology of the
Reagan Administration, the Burger Court, and the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB or Board). In August, 1981, the managerial tenor of labor relations for the
decade was politically established when President Reagan ordered the discharge of
thousands of striking air traffic controllers from federal employment.' Concommitantly,
in 1981, the Supreme Court firmly set the decade's jurisprudential tone in favor of
institutional employers, largely exempting unilateral ownership prerogatives from the
statutory duty to bargain. 2
t Copyright 0 1986 Boston College Law School.
* Associate Professor, St. John's University Law School; LL.M., Yale University Law School,
1982; J.D., Magna Cum Laude, University of Detroit, 1980; M.B.A., Wayne State University, 1977;
B.A., with honors, Catholic University of America, 1973.
The federal air traffic controllers' union called an illegal strike against their federal employer,
the Federal Aviation Administration, after collective bargaining agreement negotiations had col-
lapsed. The strike was actively supported by approximately 13,000 of the 16,400 air traffic con-
trollers within the bargaining unit represented by PATCO. The strikers violated the express no-
strike oath required for each federal employee prior to commencement of employment. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 3333 (1982). For comprehensive analysis of the PATCO strike and its legal ramifications, see
Meltzer & Sunstein, Public Employee Strikes, Executive Discretion, and the Air Traffic Controllers, 50 U.
CHI. L. REv. 731 (1983). See also S. ARONOWITZ, WORKING CLASS HERO: A NEW STRATEGY FOR
LABOR 70 (1983) ("Relying on its economic power, the union failed to understand that Reagan was
an ideologue speaking_ for a faction of capital prepared to reverse the legacy of the New Deal.").
2 See First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981). The Supreme Court stated:
We conclude that the harm likely to be done to an employer's need to operate freely
in deciding whether to shut down part of its business purely for economic reasons
outweighs the incremental benefit that might be gained through the union's partici-
pation in the decision, and we hold the decision itself is not part of Section 8(d)'s
"terms and conditions" . . . .
Id. at 686. In February, 1984, the Court further expanded the scope of employer prerogatives,
holding that the chapter 11 debtor-in-possession could unilaterally abrogate its collective bargaining
agreement without prior court approval and without prior bargaining with the union. NLRB v.
Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984). See Gregory, Labbr Contract Rejection in Bankruptcy: The Supreme Court's
Attack on Labor in NLRB v. Bildisco, 25 B.C.L. REV. 539 (1984). In June, 1984, however, these
elements of the Bildisco decision were legislatively overruled, now requiring prior collective bar-
gaining and court approval in order for the debtor in possession (employer) in bankruptcy to
abrogate the labor contract. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-353, § 541(a), 98 Stat. 390 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (1984)). See Gregory, Legal Devel-
opments Since NLRB v, Bildisco: Partial Resolution of Problems Surrounding Labor Contract Rejection in
Bankruptcy, 62 U. DEN. L. REV. 615 (1985).
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If the ideologies of the Reagan administration and the Burger Courts were the
proverbial handwriting on labor's wall, the controversial decisions of the NLRB in 1984
and 1985 certainly provided many of the footnotes. Several of the thoughtful essays in
this Annual Survey meticulously analyze these crucially important NLRB decisions.
Labor law scholars and practitioners have long been frustrated with often mercurial,
unpredictable Board adjudication. That collective discomfort has been exacerbated by
the salient decisions of the Reagan Board. This article will not directly address the
substance of these decisions; this is done in the student comments which outline the
broad substantive contours of contemporary labor law. Rather than attempt to cull a
unifying substantive labor law theme From the Reagan Board decisions, this essay will
examine the broader issues of NLRB process, policy, and politics by focusing on the
administrative difficulties of the Board's case backlog, the efficacy and role of the NLRB
adjudicatory instruments, and the substantive political choices made by the Board in
making labor law policy.
The labor policy set by the Reagan Board represents an overtly pro-employer
transition in labor law,`' an ironic commentary on the golden anniversary of the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 5 Yet the cumulative message of the Reagan Board is far
more complex, reflecting a fluid hierarchy of choices favoring not only institutional
ownership elites, but also enhancing the section 7 individual employee choice against
organization." The institutional interests of organized labor and the core section 7
employee right to organize are relegated to subordinate status, but not completely
vitiated. By better appreciating the process and policy functions of the Board, perhaps
even pro-union individual employees and organized labor can survive the eighties and
again ascertain strategic means to prosper and mature under the NLRA in the coming
decades.
The jurisprudence of the Burger Court is not uniformly anti-labor. For example, the Court
has upheld the near-sacrosanct status of the collective bargaining agreement traditional seniority
system, one of the cornerstones of the organized labor movement. Of course, these pyrrhic victories
for seniority principles may have come at the expense of affirmative action. See Memphis Fire Dept.
v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984); W. R. Grace v. Local 759, Intl Union of the United Rubber
Workers, 961 U.S. 757 (1983); see also Gregory, Conflict Between Seniority and Affirmative Action
Principles in Labor Arbitration, and Consequent Problems of Judicial Review, 57 TEMP. L.Q. 47 (1984). In
1986, the Court may finally resolve the controversy surrounding the viability of Weber-type affir-
mative action plans in public sector employment in Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 746 F.2d 1152
(6th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985).
See Changes in NLRB Law, 118 LAB. REL. REP. (BN A) 237 (Mar. 25, 1985). which states:
klhanges in NLRB law during the last year and a half have been as dramatic and as
deep as those of any other period in Board history .. the changes represent more
than just a shift from one administration to another; they require, in some instances
"a whole new way of looking at a particular issue."
' 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). The NI,RA, the Wagner Act, was enacted in 1935. Section 1 of the
Act enunciated congressional policy designed to bring relatively helpless employees into rough
parity with corporate employers through collective bargaining.
. " Section 7 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982), provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor orga-
nizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or
all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment
as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
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1. THE CASE BACKLOG AT THE BOARD: CAUSES AND CURES
Fortunately, the serious administrative problems that afflicted the Reagan Board
throughout much of its tenure have been partially alleviated. The Board will finally
operate with the full statutory complement of five members. While the case backlog due
to internal and external administrative snafus will probably haunt the Board well into
1986, there is potential for improved administrative functioning of the Board now that
it has finally returned to full membership. Nevertheless, this case backlog has fueled
much of the criticism of the Board, which undoubtedly will continue until its caseload
is under better control.'
The Board was understaffed throughout most of President Reagan's first term.
Since President Reagan took office in 1981, Chair Fanning and Members Jenkins, Miller,
Truesdale, and Zimmerman left the Board as their terms expired. By not reappointing
any of these persons, including Chair Fanning, who had been reappointed by several
prior Presidents, President Reagan deprived the Board of administrative stability, con-
tinuity, and a valuable body of labor law expertise. President Reagan's initial nominee
as Chair, John Van de Water, failed to obtain Senate approval. 8 Current Chair Dotson
and Member Dennis have served only since the spring of 1983. Members Babson and
Johansen were confirmed by the Senate and began their new terms in May, 1985.
Member Hunter, the senior Board member with service since August, 1981, recently left
the Board when his term expired in August, 1985. He did not seek reappointment.'
Since 1979, the Board has had fifteen different members. Chair Dotson understandably
regards this turnover in Board membership as the "first and foremost" problem of the
Board.")
The novice Reagan Board, deprived of continuity and stability by the President's
failure to reappoint senior members, was further crippled from August, 1983 until May,
1985. Because the vacancy caused by the expiration of Member Jenkins' term in August,
1983 was not filled, the Board was forced to operate with four members)) The Board
then was reduced to only three membersi 2 from December, 1984 until May, 1985, with
Even political conservatives recommended that the Board be maintained at full strength, via
the conservative Heritage Foundation's 600 page report to the Reagan administration, "Mandate
for Leadership II." See Heritage Foundation Report on Labor Policy, 1984 LAB. REL. YEARBOOK 245.
Two congressional reports, highly critical of the administrative backlog at the NLRB, were also
issued in 1984. See HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATION, DELAY, SLOWNESS IN DECI-
SIONMAKING AND THE CASE BACKLOG AT THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, H.R. REP. No.
1141, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). The Committee stated: "The National Labor Relations Board is
in a crisis. Delays in decisionmaking at the Board level and a staggering and debilitating case backlog
have resulted in workers being forced to wait years before cases ... are decided .... The case
backlog at the Board has risen to a record level . ." See also STAFF OF HOUSE LABOR-MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., FAILURE OF THE LABOR LAW — A BETRAYAL OF
AMERICAN WORKERS (COMM. Print 1984).
See Senate Labor Committee Rejects Pres. Reagan's Nomination of John R. Van de Water to Head
NLRB, N.Y. Times. Nov. 20, 1981, at A20. For criticism of the Senate Committee's rejection, see
Walther, Suggestions and Comments on the Future Directions of the NLRB, 34 LAB. L.J. 215, 2213 (1983);
see also Irving, The Crisis at the NLRB: A Call for Reordering Priorities, 7 EMPL. REL. L.J. 47 (1981).
9 NLRB Departure, 119 LAB. REL. Rep. (BNA) 291 (Aug. 8, 1985).
'° Dotson, Processing Cases at the NLRB, 35 LAB. L.J. 3, 5 (1984).
" After the August, 1983 expiration of Member Jenkins' term, the four Board members were
Chair Dotson and Members Hunter and Dennis, all appointed by President Reagan, and Member
Zimmerman, appointed by President Carter.
' 2 The three members were Chair Dotson and Members Hunter and Dennis.
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the expiration of Member Zimmerman's term. The Senate confirmation in May, 1985,
of the nominations of Wilford Johansen and Marshall Babson to fill the two vacancies,
briefly brought the Reagan Board to its full five person strength for the first time in
almost two years. This was quickly undone with Member Hunter leaving the Board in
August, 1985) 3 Finally, for the first time since December, 1982, the Board was restored
to full five member strength in October, 1985, with Senate confirmation of James
Stephens to fill the seat of former Member Hunter.' 4 Barring unusual departures, the
Board should maintain this full five member complement for the next year, at least until
August 27, 1986 when the term of member Dennis expires. During this time period
from 1983 until the fall of 1985 the chronically understaffed Board has been further
debilitated by allegations of bitter in-fighting and lack of collegiality among the mem-
bers. 16 Given the negative synergy of the understaffed and badly fragmented Board, it
is not surprising that the case backlog exceeded a record 1,600 cases by early 1984, 16 in
contrast to the pre-Reagan Board's normal backlog of 400 to 500 pending unfair labor
practice cases." In addition to the tremendous case backlog, only 602 unfair labor
practice decisions were rendered in 1983, as compared to the 1,185 decisions issued in
1979.' 8
Since the administrative nadir was reached in early 1984, the Board has gradually
improved case handling, issued more decisions, and reduced its case backlog.' 9 With
Chair Dotson's ongoing efforts to improve administration, 2" both case backlog and the
in-fighting should be substantially reduced 2 ' in 1986. The administrative rectification of
the case backlog can be effected in relatively expeditious fashion.
II. WHY ADJUDICATION REMAINS PREFERABLE TO RULEMAKING: THE NLRB AS LABOR
POLICY MAKER
Unlike the relatively common problem of administrative backlog at the Board, there
is a far more important structural criticism of NLRB process which presents a much
" Following the most recent musical chairs episode at the Board with senior Member Hunter's
departure in August, 1985, the current Board is comprised of five Reagan appointees: Chair Dotson
and Member Dennis, appointed in 1983; new Members Babson and Johansen, appointed in the
spring of 1985; and Member Stephens, appointed in the fall of 1985.
" Labor Confirmations, 120 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 191 (Oct, 28, 1985).
15 Member Zimmerman was especially critical of the lack of collegiality on the Board during
1984. Interview With Retiring NLRB Member, 117 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 326 (Dec. 24, 1984). For
overviews of the internal disputes among.Board members, see Keller, Infighting at Labor Board is
Reported, N.Y. Times, Jul. 11, 1984, at A2I, col. 4; Middleton, NLRB: An Agency in Turmoil, Nat'l
L,J., Jul. 2, 1984 at I; Walther, supra note 8, at 228; Letter Writing Contest Over NLRB Case Backlog,
117 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 289 (Dec. 10, 1984).
16 In February, 1984, a record backlog of 1,647 cases awaited decision by the Board. Criticism
of NLRB Politicization Backlog, 117 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 121, 123-24 (Oct. 15, 1984) [hereinafter
cited as Backlog].
17 116 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 41-42 (May 21, 1984).
It} tar,
19 In fiscal year 1984, the Board issued 1,346 decisions, a 53% increase over the number of
decisions issued in 1983. Backlog, supra note 16, at 123-24. By the summer of 1985, the NLRB had
reduced its case backlog from almost 1,700 cases in early 1984 to approximately 1,200 cases.
20 NLRB's Dotson on First Year, 115 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 163 (Feb. 27, 1984); 115 LAB. REL.
REP. (BNA) 186 (Mar. 5, 1984) (Dotson maintained that the 1984 case backlog would dissipate
following the issuance of the Board's most controversial and important lead cases).
Defense of Board Decisions and Nominees, 118 LAB. REL. RE/' . (BNA) 266 (Apr. 8, 1985) [here-
inafter cited as Defense of Board]; see also supra note 20.
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more difficult problem. With only rare, exceptional resort to rulemaking, 22 the Board
has otherwise routinely utilized adjudication 23 to set policy and to determine the course
of labor law. Many critics of the Board periodically have called for NLRB rulemaking. 24
This argument recently resurfaced because advocates of rulemaking believe that dis-
placing the Board's traditional use of adjudication with rulemaking presents the best
available method to stabilize NLRB law and to obtain greater harmony between the
Board and the circuit courts. Rulemaking more closely represents a legislative rather
than a judicial process, with greater opportunity for input into the agency's policy making
by a broad spectrum of interested persons. It is purportedly more deliberative and more
informed than ad hoc case-by-case adjudication. 25 Further, rulemaking, unlike adjudi-
cation, has only prospective effect. 26 Therefore, rulemaking is championed as a more
stable, balanced mode to chart new developments in labor law.
22 Pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), rulemaking is the "agency process for
formulating, amending, or repealing a rule." 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (1982). A rule is "the whole or a
part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to
implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy." Id. § 551(4). For a rare instance of NLRB rule-
making, see Menard Sc DiGiovanni, NLRB Jurisdiction over Colleges and Universities.' A Plea for Rule-
making, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 599, 614 (1975).
Section 6 of the NLRA expressly provides that "the Board shall have authority from time to
time to make, amend, and rescind, in the manner prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act,
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act." 29 U.S.C.
§ 156 (1982). Despite this express statutory authorization, the rulemaking power of the Board has
remained dormant.
23 Adjudication is defined in the APA as an "agency process for the formulation of an order."
5 U.S.C. § 551(7) (1982), NLRB adjudication occurs in the context of an adversarial hearing between
parties to actual cases and controversies.
24 See, e.g., Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication — Rulemaking Dilemma Under the Administrative
Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571, 589-93 (1970); Bierman, Judge Posner and the NLRB: Implications
for Labor Law Reform, 69 MINN. L. REV. 881, 892-93 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Bierman, Judge
Posner and the NLRB]; Bierman, Reflections on the Problem of Labor Board Instability, 62 U. DEN. L.
REV. 551, 562-65 (1985); Estreicher, Policy Oscillation at the Labor Board: A Plea for Rulemaking, 37
N.Y.U. CONF. ON LAB. 10-1 (1985); Fuchs, Agency Developments of Policy Through Rulemaking, 59 Nw.
U.L. REV. 781 (1965); Gomberg & Samoff, Improving A dministrative Effectiveness of the NLRB, 24 LAB.
L.J. 201, 213-17 (1973); Kahn, The NLRB and Higher Education: The Failure of Polnymaking Through
Adjudication, 21 UCLA L. REV. 63, 167-75 (1973); Menard & DiGiovanni, supra note 22, at 614-
19; Peck, A Critique of the National Labor Relations Board's Performance in Policy Formulation: Adjudication
and Rule-Making, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 254, 268-75 (1968); Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of
the National Labor Relations Board, 70 YALE L.J. 729, 752-61 (1961); Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking
or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REY. 921, 929-42 (1965);
Silverman, The Case for the National Labor Relations Board's Use of Rulemaking in Asserting Jurisdiction,
25 LAB. L.J. 607, 608-10 (1974); Summers, Politics, Policy Making and the NLRB, 6 SYRACUSE L. REV.
93, 105-06 (1954).
In 1958, the American Bar Association Labor Law Section recommended that the NLRB make
greater use of rulemaking. ABA Comm. on NLRB Practice and Procedure Proceedings, at 116, 121, 42
LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 482, 513 (1958).
ME LABOR REFORM ACT of 1977, H.R. REP. No, 8410, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), would have
provided for NLRB rulemaking regarding bargaining unit determinations, voter eligibility, and
union organizer access to employer property. The bill passed the House, but was defeated via
Senate filibuster.
In addition, congressional committee reports have advocated NLRB use of rulemaking. See
H.R. REP. No. 1141, supra note 7; Hearings on Congressional Oversight of Independent Administrative
Agencies Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm.. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong.,
2nd Sess. 916-18 (1968).
" Compare 5 U.S.C. § .553 (1982) (rulemaking procedures), with 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1982) (adjudi-
cation procedures).
" See generally Our Way Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 61, 115 L.R.R.M. 1009 (1983).
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The many controversial decisions of the Reagan Board, reversing several precedents,
were all effected through adjudication. The repeated reversals in some areas have
sparked especially intense criticism of the seemingly revolving door nature of Board
decision-making. The most prominent example of Board reversals is the state of the law
regarding the scope of permissible factual misrepresentatiOns during union election
campaigns. In 1982, after the Board reversed the applicable law for the third time in
five years, 27 Judge Pokier of the Seventh Circuit excoriated the Board for these spas-
modic, continual, and retroactive, reversals: 25
[T]he parties [were] unaware of the extent of the Board's fickleness ....
[T]he Board announced in a footnote that the new rule would apply to all
pending cases .... [B]y twice during this proceeding changing its mind as
to the applicable standard the Board has put Mosey [the employer] through
the hoops, subjecting it to protracted legal expense and uncertainty. .
[T]he Board's [is unable] to decide what standard to use in policing elections
— it has changed its collective mind three times in the last five and a half
years. 29
Other circuits have also criticized the destabilizing ad hoc nature of recent Board deci-
sions.30
Although cavalier adjudication can certainly foster the Board's whirling dervish
image, NLRB adjudication per se is not inherently flawed. Indeed, many of the 1984
decisions of the Reagan Board were favorably received by the courts of appeals. 2 ' Some
" See Midland, 263 N.L.R.B. 127, 130-31 (1982), which reinstated Shopping Kart, 228 N.L.R.B.
1311 (1977), which had overruled Hollywood Ceramic, 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962). Shopping Kart had
itself been overruled in General Kent of California, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 619 (1978), which had reinstated
the Hollywood Ceramic rule. See Comment, A Look at the Revolving NLRB Policies Governing Union
Representation Election Campaigns, 19 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 417 (1983).
28 Mosey Mfg. v. NLRB, 701 F.2d 610, 612-13 (7th Cir. 1983).
2" Id. See Bierman, Judge Posner and the NLRB, supra note 24.
," New Jersey Bell Tel. v. NLRB, 720 F.2d 789, 792, 114 L.R.R.M. 3337, 3340 (3d Cir. 1983)
("Supreme Court precedent, Board precedent, and common sense all militate against the Board's
decision in this case"); Yellow Taxi of Minneapolis v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 366, 383 n.39, 114 L.R.R.M.
3060, 3074-75 n.39 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (the court criticized the Board's "illogical and cryptic conclu-
sions").
5,
 In 1984, the Board won in whole or in part in over 80% of the 259 Board decisions appealed
to the circuits. NLRB General Counsel's Summary of Operations for Fiscal Year 1984, 118 LAB. REL. REP.
(BNA) 145, 146 (Feb. 25, 1985) (259 NLRB cases were decided by the courts of appeals in 1984,
338 in 1983, and 424 in 1982; in 1984, the Board won in whole or in part in 81.1% of the cases,
81.7% in 1983, and 79.7% in 1952). Meanwhile, outright Board losses occurred in little more than
10% of the appealed cases, which is the lowest level since 1976. Id. (in 1984, the Board lost entirely
in 10.4% of the cases taken to the courts of appeals, 12.4% in 1983, and 12.5% in 1982). See also
NLRB General Counsel's Summary of Operations for Fiscal Year 1983, 114 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 301
(Dec. 19, 1983). See also infra note 32; Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941, 118 L.R.R.M. 2649 (D.C. Cir.
1985). In Prill, the court, by the 2-1 majority of Judges Edwards and Wald over Judge Bork's
dissent, remanded the case to the Board. The Board was ordered to reconsider its prior ruling in
Meyers Industries, 115 L.R.R.M. 1025 (1984), that a nonunion employee's activity is not concerted
within the meaning of § 7 of the NLRA unless it is undertaken with or on the authority of other
employees. The court majority found that the Board in Meyers Industries had "failed to rely on its
own judgment and expertise, and instead based its decision on an erroneous view of the law." Prill,
755 F.2d at 956, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2661. But see Hotel Employees Local 11 v. NLRB, 706 F.2d 1006,
119 L.R.R.M. 2624 (9th Cir. 1985) (the court affirmed and enforced the Board's return to a totality
of the circumstances standard in Rossmore House, 116 L.R.R.M. 1025 (1984), for determining the
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courts of appeals maintain that the series of reversals by the Reagan Board, rather than
exploring uncharted new waters, have restored labor law to sound principles and cor-
rected the radical leftist deviance of Carter Board decisions." The circuit courts were
more often incensed with the decisions of the Carter Board than with those of the
Reagan Board. Chair Dotson maintains that the Reagan Board has properly responded
to the appellate coons' chagrin with the Carter Board decisions. The Reagan Board's
decisions repudiating ill-considered, tenuous Carter Board precedents have restabilized,
rather than further radicalized, labor law." This favorable response by the courts of
appeals certainly militates against the wholesale or precipitous repudiation of Board
adjudication. With many Reagan administration appointees now on the courts of appeals,
it is not surprising that the recent NLRB decisions have been, for the most part, favorably
received by the circuits.
The Reagan Board's adjudication cannot be held responsible for the collapse of
labor law and loss of Board credibility. Admittedly, adjudication can be mercurial and
legality of an employer's questioning of an employee concerning union sentiments); UAW v. NLRB,
765 F.2d 175, 119 L.R.R.M. 2801 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (the court affirmed the Board's decision in
Milwaukee Spring Division II that the employer could relocate work during the contract mid-term
without violating § 8(d), following bargaining with the union).
"Case Backlog at Labor Board, 115 LAB, REL. REP. (BNA) 186, 188 (Mar. 15, 1984) (where the
courts of appeals have "squarely rejected" NLRB decisions, the Reagan Board will now conform
and back away from previous "'outright defiance of court decisions, with which they have become
impatient'"); see also Zimmerman & Dunn, Relations Between the NLRB and the Courts of Appeals: A
Tale of Acrimony and Accommodation, 8 DAP. REL. L.]. 4 (1982). More recently, in Debating Merits of
Current NLRB Decisions, 118 LAB. Rio.. REP. (BNA) 281 (Apr. 15, 1985) as management attorney
maintained that the Reagan Board decisions have restored Board credibility in the courts of appeals.
"'The fact of the matter is this Board was confronted with ... a continuous across-the-board
hostility in the circuits.'" The Carter Board "'had gone so far and clone so many things that the
circuits were fundamentally hostile to the NLRB and their decisions .... What tins Board had
done is reestablish credibility with ihe circuits." Id. at 284. In Rulemaking as Aid in NLRB Policy
Reversals, 116 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 142 (June 25, 1984), former NLRB General Counsel Peter
Nash defended recent controversial decisions of the Reagan Board as correcting the pro-labor
excesses of the Carter Board: "the 'fervor' over the Board's recent policy reversals is the 'result of
a larger political agenda' on the part of labor advocates. 'There has not been a substantial reversal
of Board doctrine if you read and analyze the decisions." Id. at 144. See also Defense of NLRB
Rulings, 116 LAB, REL. REp, (BNA) 3 (May 7, 1984) (Member Dennis, appointed by President
Reagan in 1983, characterized Reagan Board decisions as "a return to 'normalcy' rather than a
curtailment of the rights of unions and individual employees"). In Walther, supra note 8, at 228,
the author stated:
I do not believe that over the years ahead we will find a major or strong tilt toward
management or the right at the Board. I do predict that there will be a leveling of the
Board or a movement back fronts the tilt to the left that has occurred, especially since
the late seventies.
Id. In Defense of Board, supra note 21, the author stated:
15 of 16 decisions handed down by the "prior liberal Board" but reversed by the
current Board, have been overturned by appeals courts • [T]he Board has gotten
"rid of bad law that has not been acceptable to the appellate courts" .... [T]he Board's
reversals have returned the law to what it was, and are its line with appeals court
rulings
Id. See also Dotson, Remarks to Textile Manufaclurers, 120 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 6, 7 (Sept. 2, 1985)
("At last. ... we no longer have circuit courts referring, as some have in the recent past, to the
Board's lack of 'common sense").
" See supra note 32.
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capricious, with potentially pernicious, retroactive application. But it has the virtues
which more ponderous rulemaking cannot provide: flexibility, dynamism, and the ability
to respond to contextually fluid circumstances. These are necessary attributes for any
effective decision-making instrument in the real world of volatile labor relations.
Displacing adjudication with rulemaking would unwisely depoliticize the NLRB,
directly counter to Congress' design of the Board as a politically responsive agency.
Board members are appointed by the President for staggered terms, and properly reflect
majoritarian political preferences 34 in setting labor policy. Board ability to adapt to
continually changing labor relations is the primary benefit of adjudication."
Through adjudication, the Board properly functions as a labor policy maker, and
not just as a resolver of immediate, individual case disputes. It serves as a means for
adopting national labor policy to a continually shifting political climate. 3e To paraphrase
Justice Marshall's constitutional aphorism," it is a living labor law that the Board ex-
pounds, and a living labor policy that it elucidates. This goal is best effected through
adjudication, which is much better suited to respond quickly to political and labor
developments than is the far more cumbersome rulemaking. 38 Even informal rulemaking
lacks the necessary fluidity of adjudication. With adjudication, if the policy direction
proves unwise, it can be readily reversed by subsequent adjudication. While subsequent
reversals may occasionally result in doctrinal chaos, this is a necessary price to preserve
the Board's contextual flexibility, which is vital to shaping dynamic labor policy. Admit-
tedly, this can be frustrating. But policy is not formed in a vacuum; it is contingent upon
the Board's ability to assess live facts and to shape policy interstitially around the broad
statutory terms of art in the Act.
The choice of continued adjudication over rulemaking is not, however, an absolute
win-lose proposition. Each mode has considerable assets and liabilities. Policy making by
the Board will never be a paragon of jurisprudential clarity because volatile, real-world
labor relations are far removed from the realm of pure theory. On balance, Board
adjudication has proved to be the more efficacious policy instrument in the imperfect
but real world. Despite some earlier equivocation,39 the Supreme Court has also endorsed
Board adjudication" to allow the Board to deal with the infinite vagaries of evolving
34 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1982). See Bernstein, supra note 24: "The unavoidable periodic selection
of a President enables new majorities (coalitions of minorities) to obtain political power which carries
the authority to make appointments to agencies. These new appointees reflect the most recent
political alignment . ." Id. at 575 n.I0.
" See Note, NLRB Rulemaking: Political Reality Versus Procedural Fairness, 89 YALE L.J. 982, 984
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, NLRB Rulemaking); Rulemaking as Aid in NLRB Policy Reversals,
116 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 142, 145 ( June 25, 1984) ("complaint by labor law practitioners about
the 'instability' of Board rulings are 'not really justified' because Congress intended [the] NLRB to
be a flexible decisionmaker").
36 Summers, supra note 24, at 100.
37 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
" Note, NLRB Rulemaking, .supra note 35, at 999.
39 See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 763-65 (1969).
"See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace. 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974) ("the Board is not precluded from
announcing new principles in an adjudicative proceeding and that the choice between rulemaking
and adjudication lies in the first instance within the Board's discretion"). See also SEC v. Ghenery
Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947). The Court indicated a general preference that the administrative
agency (SEC) normally use rulemaking, but recognized the need for agency adjudication to respond
quickly to unforeseen exigencies. In those situations, the agency must retain power to deal with
the problems on a case to case basis if the administrative process is to be effective." Id. at 203.
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labor relations under the AcL 4 ' To freeze the Board's policy making effectiveness by
turning to rulemaking would unwisely exalt administrative law theory over the reality
and substance of labor law practice. 42 The Board must continue to make labor policy,
rather than routinely and mechanically apply the Act. 45 As Professor Summers forcefully
concluded in his important article over thirty years ago:
The Board, in deciding cases arising under the statute, must exercise the
power of choice. The choice is between alternatives which represent not only
conflicting interests of the immediate parties but also conflicting views as to
labor policy. The new members may make the same choices as the old
members, or they may make different choices and order changes, but willy-
nilly they must choose. The Board could not, if it would, escape its functions
of policy making.^4
Despite its recognized weaknesses, adjudication, rather than rulemaking, remains the
preferable NLRB labor policy and law-making instrument.
CONCLUSION
The labor policy direction of the Reagan Board has infuriated much of organized
labor.'5 Rather than call for abolition of the Board and of the Act and return to the "law
11 See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941). The Court stated that:
in the very nature of things Congress could not catalogue all the devices and stratagems
for circumventing the policies of the Act. Nor could it define the whole gamut of
remedies to effectuate these policies in an infinite variety of specific situations. Con-
gress met these difficulties by leaving the adoption of means to end to the empiric
process of administration. The exercise of the process was committed to the Board,
subject to limited judicial review.
Id. at 194.
° Note, NLRB Rulemaking, supra note 35, at 1000.
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	 supra note 24, at 96:
It is evident that the Board cannot "administer the statute as written and as intended
by Congress.". The words of the statute and the intent of Congress provide some
limitations and guides, but there still remains a substantial area of discretion within
which the Board must make choices between competing values and policies.
Id.
"Id. at 98.
45 AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland castigated the Reagan Board as "anti-labor ideologues,"
and as advocates of "the most narrow, retrograde employer interests." Criticism of Labor Department,
115 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 195 (Mar. 5, 1984).
The AFL-CIO Executive Council categorized the Reagan Board's policy as one of "malevolence"
toward labor.
An NLRB controlled by two employer lawyers and a Heritage Foundation consultant,
each hand-picked by this administration, has no intention of enforcing the national
labor policy with an even hand .. . . The present NLRB's legal theory is that employers
... should be able to do whatever they want whenever they want 
AFL-CIO Views on NLRB Actions, 1 1 fi LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 46 (May 21, 1984).
In three days of hearings before the Labor Advisory Committee, several union advocates
sharply criticized NLRB decisions and the labor policies of the Reagan administration. Thomas
Gleason, president of the Longshoremen's Union, said, "the pendulum in Labor Board decisions
has swung so rapidly and erratically over the recent past that volumes of Board precedents no
longer can be relied upon by unions or employers and their legal counsel." Criticizing NLRB at
Republican Hearings, 116 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 189 ( Jul. 9, 1984).
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of the jungle," the Act and its administration should be improved and strengthened on
its Golden Anniversary." For example, exploring the viability of a proposed federal
labor court of appeals to stabilize labor law theory and practice, while allowing the
politically responsive NLRB to function unaltered, would be far more productive than
Prominent union leaders sharply criticized Reagan Board decisions in testimony before a House
oversight hearing held by the Labor Subcommittee on Labor - Management Relations and the Gov-
ernment Operations Subcommittee on Manpower and Housing. William Wynn, president of the
United Tool and Commercial Workers Union, the AFL-CIO's largest union, stated that labor
"cannot rely on the NLRB for justice .... Labor-Management relations are back in the jungle
Nabor has been stripped of the weapons we need for our self-defense," William Bywater, president
of the Electrical Workers, said, "the Reagan Administration is so anti-labor that they make Nixon
and Ford look great. 1 swear they'd make even Hoover look good. - Challenging Impartiality of NLRB,
116 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 179 (Jul. 2, 1984). John Sweeney, President of the Service Employees,
said, "the people who are sworn to uphold a law do their most to subvert it." Unions' Opposition to
St. Francis Decision, 117 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 131 (Oct. 15, 1984),
At the thirty - first annual institute on labor law by the Southwestern Legal Foundation, union
attorney Lawrence Cohen advised labor clients to avoid going to the Board. He termed the Reagan
appointees "a gang of three' ... who are methodically scuttling the Act which they are charged to
protect." Dr.pact on NLRB of Chairman Dotson, 117 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 164 (Oct. 29, 1984). See
also Debating Merits of Current NLRB Decisions, 118 Las. REL. REP. (BNA) 281 (Apr. 15, 1985) (SMU
law professor Charles Morris charged the NLRB with interpreting the Act to infringe on specific
Congressional objectives); Vehar, Labor Law Reform: Do Labor Organizations Have Equal Access to the
System?, 62 U. DEN. L. Ray. 571 (1985); Noble, In 50 Years, Unions Move from Fans to Foes of Labor
Board, N.Y. Times, Jul. 9, 1985, at A14, col. 2.
On related fronts, organized labor has opposed most of the Reagan administration's nominees
to the Board. The Teamsters Union led demands on the White House to fire Donald Dotson as
Chair of the NLRB: Labor Letter, Wall St. J., May 22, 1984, at 1, col. 5. Labor had initially opposed
the appointment of Dotson to the Board. Labor Letter, Wall St. J., Feb. 2, 1983, at 3, col. 4.
The organized labor lobby successfully blocked appointment of President Reagan's first nom-
inee as Chair of the NLRB. Senate Labor Committee Rejects Pres. Reagan's Nomination of John H. Van
de Water to Head NLRB, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1981, at A20; Walther, supra note 8, at 228.
Before the Senate's surprising confirmation of Rosemary Collyer as the NLRB General Counsel
by voice vote on April 4, 1985, her nomination had been bitterly opposed by organized labor. See
Approval of Collyer as NLRB General Counsel, 118 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 287 (Apr. 15, 1985). See also
AFL-CIO Opposition to Collyer Nomination, 116 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 30 (May 14, 1984). AFL-CIO
President lane Kirkland said that Collyer had "no visible qualifications in the field of labor law"
and that her appointment is another example of the Reagan administration's "contempt for the
rights and concerns of working people." Id. Regarding the Reagan nomination of Collyer as General
Counsel, see also Delayed Vote On NLRB Nominee, 116 LAB. REL: REP. (BNA) 44 (May 21, 1984);
AFL-CIO Views on NLRB Actions, 116 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 145 ( June 25, 1984); Labor Letter, Wall
St. J., June ]2, 1984, at 1, col. 5.
Prior to his Senate confirmation in May 1985, organized labor took a skeptical preliminary
view of management attorney Marshall Babson's nomination to the NLRB. Nominations for Two
NLRB Vacancies, 118 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 201 (Mar. 18, 1985).
" Gould, Mistaken Opposition to the NLRB, N.Y. Times, June 20, 1985, at A27, col. 2:
Lane Kirkland, President of the AFL-CIO, is toying with a misguided proposal by
advocating the repeal of the National Labor Relations Act .... Labor is in no position
to discard the protections under the Act and to return to bare-fisted scuffles with
management. The law, for the most part, has served labor well, and union leadership
should work to strengthen it, not abolish it .... Repeal of the Act on its 50th anni-
versary would sacrifice the benefits of law without eliminating its burdens.
Id. See also Estreicher, Workers Still Need Labor Law's Shield, N.Y. Times, Jul. 21, 1985, at F2, col. 3;
Pacific Coast Labor Law Conference, 119 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 47 (May 20, 1985) (Arthur Goldberg,
General Counsel of the Textile Workers Union, said deregulating labor law and repealing the Act
is unwarranted and would leave employees arid unions unprotected and operating under a regime
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simplistic resort to rulemaking. 47 While labor law policy should evolve in stable, coherent
fashion, it is of paramount importance that it be permitted to evolve. Rulemaking may
stabilize Board administration, but it would seriously debilitate the Flexibility required
for Board policy making. Stultification of policy cannot be countenanced.
The administrative difficulties of the Board's case backlog and internal discord
should substantially dissipate now that the Board is restored to the full five person
complement. History has demonstrated that most radical criticisms of prior Board
changes in labor law and policy were exaggerated." Over the past fifty years, the Act,
of employer-imposed rules); Discussion of NLRB Policies at New York Bar Association, 119 LAB. REL.
REP. (BNA) 71 (May 27, 1985) (Samuel Kaynard, Regional Director of the NLRB in Brooklyn, New
York, said the NLRA has worked well for fifty years and "the absence of either the Act or the
Board would serve no purpose"). See also infra note 50.
47 More than a decade ago, several scholarly and legislative proposals for a federal labor court
to centralize and stabilize labor law practice and administration received considerable attention. It
is time to re-examine the merits of these earlier proposals, and perhaps to refine and finally
implement them via limited reform legislation. See generally Bartosic, Labor Law Reform — The ,V.I.R11
and a Labor Court, 4 GA. L. REV. 647 (1970); Farmer, Problems of Organization and Administration of
the National Labor Relations Board, 29 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 353, 356 (1960) ("ultimate transfer of the
Board's judicial functions to a labor court or even to the existing fcderal district courts may now
be reasonably predicted"); Lyme, The NLRB and Suggested Alternatives, 22 LAB. L.J. 408 (1971);
Miller, Administrative Prosecution but Decisions by the Court — A Way Out of the Procedural Morass of U.S.
Labor Law?, 12 GONZAGA L. REV. 19 (1976); Morris, Procedural Reform in Labor Law — A Preliminary
Paper, 35 J. AIR L. & Comm. 537 (1969); Morris, The Case for Unitary Enforcement of Federal Labor
Law, 26 Sw. L.J. 471 (1972); Morris, The NLRB: Rs Future, 26 LAB. 14 334, 336 (1975) ("unitary
system of enforcement which would interrelate, ... identify and vitalize the various laws which
regulate employee relations, would be the proper course kir labor reform generally"); Powell &
Goerlich, An Invitation to Improve a Government Service, 25 ADMIN. L. REV. 49 (1973); Schutkin, One
Nation Indivisible — A Plea for a United States Court of Labor Relations, 20 LAB. L.J. 94 (1969); Seligson,
The National Labor Relations Board: A Proposal, 6 LAB. 103 (1955). Various legislative proposals
for some form of a federal labor court or other radical restructuring of NLRA administration were
advanced more than a decade ago by Senators Tower, Griffin and Dole, and Congressperson
Thompson. See S. 1384, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); S. 3671, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970); District
Court Jurisdiction Over Unfair Labor Practice Cases: Hearings on S. 3671 Before the Subcomm. on Separation
of Power of the Senate Comm. on the judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); H.R. 7152, 92nd Cong., 1st
Sess. (1971); S. 560, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
48 The Board has been sharply criticized throughout its history. For its first seventeen years, all
Board members were appointed by Democratic presidents. Union unfair labor practices were not
added until the Act was amended by the Taft-Hartley Labor Management Relations Act of 1947.
The classic early employer criticism of the Board as the tool of labor was The G-D Labor Board, 18
FORTUNE 52 (Oct. 1938). 1n 1940. a special committee of the House concluded the Board had
"radical tendencies" and "pronounced C.I.O. sympathies. - SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, FINAL REPORT, at 149, No, 3109, Part 1, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess.
(1940). For a compendium of early employer opposition to the Board, see Gal -torn & Linfield,
Politics and Labor Relations: An Appraisal of Criticisms of NLRB Procedure, 39 CoLust. L. Rev. 339
(1939).
Labor and management alternated their support and criticism of the Board, depending on the
policies and politics the particular White House incumbent effectuated through Board iaw. For
balanced commentary on the Eisenhower Board, see Note, The NLRB Under Republican Administra-
tion: Recent Trends and Their Political Implications, 55 CoLum. L. REV. 852 (1955). Regarding the
Kennedy-Johnson Board, see Murphy, The National Labor Relations Board — An Appraisal, 52 MINN.
L. REV. 819, 844 (1968) ("fclertainly the Board is not pro-union in any invidious or opprobrious
sense, however, the Board may fairly he said to be pro-union"); cf. Petro, Expertise, the NLRB, and
the Constitution: Things Abused and Things Forgotten, 14 WAYNE L. REV. 1126, 1146, 1151 (1968)
[hereinafter.cited as Petro, Expertise], stating: "The Board seems to want every employee in the
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the Board, and the parties have never yet been in extreinis. The controversy surrounding
the 1984 and 1985 decisions of the Reagan Board will gradually subside. 49
 Even the
current radical critics will probably recover from various stages of intellectual apoplexy.
While the balance of the eighties will probably solidify "management's decade," it will
probably not toll the death knell of either the Board, the Act, or of organized labor. 50
nation to wear a union label .... President Kennedy had a blatantly pro-union majority within a
year or so of his accession." Regarding the Nixon Board, see Beaird & Player, Whither the Nixon
Board?, 7 GA. L. REV. 607 (1973); Isaacson, Discernible Trends in the "Miller" Board — Practical
Considerations for the Labor Counsel, 23 LAB. L.J. 531 (1972). Supporters of the Reagan Board argue
that it has properly corrected the radical pro-labor excesses of the Carter Board. See Van de Water,
The NLRB ... New Directions, 12 STETSON L. REV. 297 (1983); Walther, supra note 8. Cf. Modjeska,
The Reagan Board: Phase 1, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 95 (1985). For commentary on the propriety and role
of criticism of the Board, see Booker & Coe, An Analysis of the Objectivity of the Criticisms of the NLRB,
6 AM. Bus. L.J. 535 (1968); Booker & Coe, The NLRB and its Critics, 17 LAB. L.J. 522 (1966); Dunav,
The Role of Criticism in the Work of the National Labor Relations Board, 16 N.Y.U. Com'. ON LAB. 205
(1963).
'9 See supra note 20.
so For examples of persons with opposite views, see Weiler, Promises To Keep: Securing Worker's
Rights To Self Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1769 (1983) ("contemporary
labor law more and more resembles an elegant tombstone for a dying institution" — Professor
Weiler argues for a revitalization of labor protections under the Act).
Leftist critical scholars have argued that the NLRA was murdered in its crib long ago by the
New Deal Court and by liberal theory. According to this leftist critique, even if the Reagan Board
wanted to administer the coup de grace to organized labor, it would be shooting a corpse. See J.
ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW (1983); Klare, The Judicial Deradical-
ization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN, L. REV.
265 (1978); Stone, The Post War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509 (1981).
Even more recently, criticism of the Reagan Board has produced a bizarre, unholy alliance
between some elements of organized labor and the radical right, arguing for abolition of the Act
and the Board and a return to the free, unregulated law of the market (jungle). For example, on
June 20, 1984 Robert Pleasure, Associate General Counsel of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters
& Joiners of America stated:
"[When asked whether] we ought to return to the law of the jungle, through a
repeal of the Act . . . our answer to that is that we are living under the law of the
jungle right now, except that unions are living in a cage and the employers are well
armed."
Vehar, Labor Law Reform: Do Labor Organizations Have Equal Access to the System?, 62 U. DEN. L.J.
571, 571 n.3 (1985) (quoting STAFF OF HOUSE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE,
FAILURE OF THE LABOR LAW - A BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN WORKERS, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. at 23
(Comm. Print 1984)). The President of the United Mine Workers of America, Richard L. Trumka,
in a statement before the same subcommittee, similarly stated: "'The time has come For us to
question whether the National Labor Relations Act ... has become an albatross on the labor
movement.— Id. (quoting STAFF OF HOUSE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE, FAILURE
OF THE LABOR LAW - A BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN WORKERS, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. at 23 (Comm.
Print 1984)). See also Pacific Coast Labor LaW Conference,119 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 48 (May 20, 1985)
( James Herman, President of the International Longshoremen's Union, urged unions to avoid
resort to the NLRB).
Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE
L.J. 1357, 1357 (1983) (NLRA "is in large measure a mistake that, if possible, should be scrapped
in favor of the adoption of a sensible common law regime relying heavily upon tort and contract
law"); Epstein, Abolish the Board, Deregulate Unions, N.Y. Times, Jul. 21, 1985, at F2; see also Petro,
Expertise, supra note 48; Petro, What Will the New Congress Do About the Taft-Hartley Act, 4 LAB.
156 (1953); REYNOLDS, POWER AND PRIVILEGE (1984); Seligson, supra note 47, at 105 ("the flow of
events in the past 20 years has minimized the importance of the Board to the extent that serious
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If the Act and the Board are not abolished or otherwise radically transmogrified in the
heat of the passions of the moment, one can be cautiously optimistic that the doom
sayers can be proven wrong. Reports of the death of the Act are greatly exaggerated."
The destiny and continued relevance of the Act remains, for the next few years, in the
hands of the Reagan Board.
As the following essays demonstrate, contemporary labor and employment law is
not monolithically aligned against employees and their unions, despite an obvious pro-
employer tilt. With careful refinement, most of these recent NLRB decisions provide a
realistic, albeit employer-oriented, framework for future developments.
Labor law policy is inherently controversial. Present heated criticism of the Board
certainly is not unprecedented. It is difficult but indispensable to maintain doctrinal
stability without rigidity and NLRB political responsiveness without caprice. The Board
deserves an opportunity to preserve this delicate balance without immediate legislative
interference. If the Board is allowed to continue to fashion evolving labor law policy
through adjudication, and does so in a more deliberate and thoughtful fashion than
evidenced in some of the 1984 and 1985 decisions, NLRA theory and Board adminis-
tration can not only survive, but also learn from and grow beyond this latest flashpoint
period in the history of modern labor law,
It is a simplistic generalization to say that "law is politics" 52 and politics is law. This
would short-circuit the important intellectual process of carefully analyzing the salient
labor and employment law decisions of the Board and the judiciary. Simplistic political
platitudes certainly cannot exculpate the Board from responsibility for its at least occa-
sionally frenetic and precipitous decision-making." There is, however, some degree of
very real truth in this generalization, especially when applied to contemporary labor and
employment law. They are undeniably permeated with political values. Rather than
consideration should be given to its abolition"). But see Bartosic, supra note 47, at 647, in which
Dean Bartosic called these radical abolitionists ''Bourbons ... who use the Board as a whipping boy
when their actual purpose is to attack ruthlessly the institution of collective bargaining." See Getman
& Kohler, The Common Law, Labor Law and Reality: A Response to Professor Epstein, 92 YALE L.J. 1415.
1416 (1983), which asserts: "Professor Epstein reiterates many of the same propositions, syllogisms,
and rationalizations of those who opposed the enactment of the NLRA and the Norris-LaGuardia
Act in the first place...." Irving, Do We Need A Labor Board?, 30 LAB. L.J. 387 (1979); Jenkins,
What is the National Labor Relations Board?, 12 U. FLA. L. REv. 354, 355 (1959) (the NLRB "or a
similar institution is absolutely essential to the proper functioning of an industrial democracy");
Ratner, The Quasi-Judicial NLRB Revisited, 12 LAB. L.J. 685, 686 (1961) ("Under the guise of attacking
the Board as one-sided and biased, what they were really attacking was the statutory scheme itself").
See also supra note 46.
51 Of course, if the Reagan Board is unable to coalesce and to self-monitor its case law adju-
dication to insure more stability, NLRB law could certainly collapse into total irrelevancy. If that
occurs, labor relations would quickly return de facto to the pre-Act "law of the jungle."
52 D. KAIRYS, LEGAL REASONING IN THE POLITICS or LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE: (1982).
Law is simply politics by other means „ „ rElhe law has provided a falsely legitimizing
justification for a decision that is ultimately social and political .... EUInstated and
lost in the mire of contradictory precedents and justifications was the central point
that none of these cases was or could he decided without ultimate reference to values
and choices of a political nature.
Id. at I I, 13, 14. This manifesto of the leftist critical legal studies movement echoed many of the
earlier themes of American Legal Realism, through a thick screen of Marxist and continental
philosophy. See Gregory, Book Review, 1983 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 205.
55 See supra notes 27-30.
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being exclusively negative influences, however, the political choices by the Board can be
a positive, actualizing force. The Board must continue to reflect, in thoughtful and
careful fashion consonant with the spirit of the Act, contemporary political values in the
process of adjudicating cases and continually shaping our evolving labor law and labor
policy. Although it surely merits careful study, and while there is always room for
improvement and reform, the Board must be permitted the freedom to administer the
Act and to shape labor law in a politically responsible fashion. The unpalatable alternative
of shackling the politics of the Board through rulemaking would pose far more serious
threat to the future of labor law than would any of the decisions of the Reagan Board.
Fortunately, this too shall pass, and the Board, the Act, employers, unions, and
employees shall progress, however fitfully, into the twenty-first century under the key-
stone National Labor Relations Act.
